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Revising UCC Article 2:
A View from the Trenches
by
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL*
Introduction
A. Background
I participated in the process to revise Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) Article 2, Sales from 1987 until resigning in July, 1999, first as
Chair of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial
Code (PEB) Study Group on Article 2' and then as Reporter to the
Article 2 Drafting Committee, appointed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). This is the first time I have spoken
in public about that experience.
Reporters work in the trenches. When things are going well, the
trench is wide and not very deep and the view is excellent. In times of
trouble, the trench narrows and deepens. Unless the Reporter is
actively involved in negotiating with various interest groups or has a
good flow of information about what is going on, the view from the
trench is impaired.
There was plenty of trouble in the Article 2 process, much of it
coming from decisions made by NCCUSL leadership outside of
* Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Visiting
Professor, University of San Diego School of Law, Spring 2001. This paper is a revision of
remarks made at the Association of American Law Schools program on Perspectives on
Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, in San Francisco on January 4,2001.
1. The PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2
STUDY GROUP is printed in 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1991), along with an Appraisal by a
Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code. This Appraisal and
the continuing participation of the Task Force provided invaluable assistance to the
process. See also Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB
Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW.
1869 (1991) (a Report prepared for the PEB).
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drafting committee meetings. My view from the trenches, therefore,
was frequently impaired. Thus, I will speak about appearances when
I had no first hand knowledge of what was going on. Speaking
candidly about appearances will give other participants in this panel
an opportunity to respond or to set the record straight about the
politics of revising the UCC in general, and Article 2 in particular.
B. The Partnership
Over the years, the ALI and NCCUSL2 have had a successful
partnership in the drafting, promulgation, and revision of the UCC.
The UCC is an example of private lawmaking from the ground up
rather than public law making from the top down. The result has
been a remarkably uniform and flexible body of state commercial
law.3
There is potential tension in the partnership because the partners
have somewhat different goals. At the risk of over-simplification, the
goal of the ALI is to "get it right" (on the merits) and the goal of
NCCUSL is to "get it right enough to get it enacted." Resolving this
tension is not an easy task because of disagreements over what is
"right" and how to get there.
Getting it "right" is complicated by several factors.
First, there are disagreements about the scope of the codification
and the policies that ought to be pursued in the revision A common
method of resolving these disagreements is to "put it in the
comments" or "leave it to the courts." Those opposed to consumer
protection provisions in the UCC might prefer to leave those issues
to other state or federal law.
Second, a Drafting Committee rarely has any comprehensive
empirical studies of commercial practices and needs or of the impact
of any suggested changes. Thus, the Drafting Committee must be
2. See generally Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship,
and the Restatements of Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 576 (1998). But see Jonathan R.
Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212,
1214-15 (1993) (noting danger of "capture" by interest groups of uniform state law
process).
3. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform
State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996) (explaining why State Legislatures might adopt
uniform laws developed in a decentralized process producing a consensus influenced by
interest groups).
4. For a monumental historical and comparative study of codification, see Gunther
A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 435 (2000).
5. See James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting: Consumer
Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 219 (1997) (arguing
against inclusion and suggesting that a UCC with consumer protection provisions will not
be enactable).
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satisfied by "second best" data such as that found in judicial opinions,
law review articles, treatises, the experience of the Reporters,
members of the Drafting Committee, and observers in and
commentators on the process. Even with all interests represented in
the process, the Drafting Committee will frequently be "shooting in
the dark."
Third, there is no such thing as a politically neutral revision. The
experience of the participants is inevitably influenced by their own
preferences or perceived best interests, whether or not they are paid
to advocate a particular point of view. Reporters have their
preferences and members of the Drafting Committee may align more
with the goals of NCCUSL than the ALI and vice versa. Thus, the
final product will usually be far from ideal. It will reflect the
competing interests in and around the drafting process and, to some
extent, the problems of enactability.
The difficulty in getting it right is eased when there are open
drafting processes and balanced participation and where the art of
compromise and adjustment is practiced. Sound drafting processes
frequently produce balanced outcomes that are approved by both the
ALI and NCCUSL. Those approved outcomes-the final drafts-
can then be adjusted or varied through negotiation in order to secure
uniform enactment by the States.6
In sum, "getting it right" does not mean an idealized product that
cannot be enacted. Rather, the final product from an open process
has been tested constantly by the expertise and experience of those
participating and, to some extent, by the realities of enactment.7
Not everyone agrees that ALI-NCCUSL drafting processes are
sound or produce good results. Professor Edward L. Rubin, for
example, asserts that not all of the relevant interests were represented
in the revision of Articles 3 and 4 (i.e., the banks called the shots) and
that the result was a flawed statute that "allows serious market
failures."' He argues that efficiency "can only be achieved through
a... balanced process in which all interests are represented" and
concludes: "Either ALI and NCCUSL should be reformed, or their
efforts should be preempted by federal legislation, as they have been
for credit cards and consumer electronic payments. 9
6. For example, Article 2A required substantial revision after it had been approved
by the ALI and NCCUSL before it was enacted.
7. See Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws- Observations from the
Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707 (1998) (describing revision process).
8. Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4,
42 ALA. L. REv. 551,560-70 (1991).
9. Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV.
1903, 1925 (2000).
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Professor Linda J. Rusch, the Associate Reporter to the Article 2
process, makes the same point:
NCCUSL needs to examine its method of doing business. Uniform
enactability results when the act represents a balanced product
forged in a process of consensus. If the process is not conducted in
a manner that forges that consensus, but rather gives power to
lobbying groups to have it their way, pursuit of the enactability goal
runs roughshod over the reason why enactibility is desirable-that
the act represents good balanced policy."
The trouble with the Article 2 process, however, did not arise from a
lack of balance within the Drafting Committee. Rather, I believe that
the Article 2 process was compromised by three decisions by
NCCUSL leadership,1 all of which were made without consideration
or vote by the Drafting Committee, and all of which were made in
response to lobbying pressure. But first some background.
I. Revising Article 2
A. Article 2 and the World Around It
The Article 2 process cannot be evaluated in isolation. There
was simultaneous and overlapping action in other trenches. During
the thirteen-year-life of the Article 2 process, the revision of UCC
Article 9, Secured Transactions, and the drafting of former UCC
Article 2B, now the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (UCITA), and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) were completed. Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, Products Liability, was completed by the ALI in 1998. At the
same time, Article 1 was under revision (and still is) and Article 2A
on leases was expected to conform, where feasible, with Revised
Article 2. During this period, there were frequent skirmishes
between occupants of the different trenches about the scope and
content of each project. This required persistent but ad hoc efforts by
NCCUSL to achieve maximum uniformity and style consistency-
efforts that never resolved important disagreements between the
Article 2 and UCITA processes.
10. See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never
Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1715 (1999). Professor
Rusch, who was Associate Reporter to the Article 2 revision from 1996-1999, collects and
classifies the growing literature on the UCC revision process. See id. at 1687 n.13.
11. By NCCUSL leadership I mean a group that usually included the Executive
Director, the current and future President, and other influential Commissioners. The
Chair of the Article 2 Drafting Committee, who is a Commissioner and a former President
of NCCUSL, however, was not included in this group.
12. See discussion of the rise and fall of the "hub and spoke" concept infra Part I.B.1.
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Nevertheless, each project had long and open drafting processes.
Experienced, talented people were involved. There were preliminary
studies, seemingly endless open meetings of Drafting Committees, a
flow of public drafts and commentary, and, ultimately, decisions by
qualified Drafting Committees. A lot of sunshine accompanied these
lengthy drafting processes, the continued efforts to resolve border
disputes, and the purported final drafts. But the outcomes for Article
9, UCITA, and Article 2 differed sharply.
Revised Article 9, a complete and complex revision of an already
difficult Article, was approved by the ALI and NCCUSL and has now
been enacted by several States. There was virtually no opposition in
the ALI or NCCUSL. Apparently the Partnership got it right and
may get it enacted in most states. 3
UCITA, a new, complex, and controversial Act dealing with
transactions in computer information, met opposition at the ALI
(and, in fact, was never presented for final approval) but was
approved after a difficult session by NCCUSL and is now being
pushed for adoption by the States as a free standing act. The road
ahead for UCITA is rocky, however, for there are those who still
assert that UCITA did not get it right and should not be enacted.4
What about Revised Article 2? After twelve years of effort
(including the PEB Study), the May, 1999 Draft was approved by the
ALL Officers of NCCUSL5 supported the revision on the floor of
the 1999 ALI annual meeting. Revised Article 2 had apparently
gotten it right! During the final reading at the 1999 annual meeting of
NCCUSL, however, the ALI-approved draft was pulled from the
agenda16 by the same NCCUSL leadership that had previously
supported it and deferred until the 2000 annual meeting. At this
point, I resigned as Reporter in protest.
13. See Conference on Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, SFO1 ALI-
ABA 1 (2000) (discussion of all aspects by leading experts); see also Harry C. Sigman &
Edwin E. Smith, Revised UCC Article 9 Overview, SF06 ALI-ABA 1 (2000). But see
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture,
and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Uniform Consumer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Objections from the Consumer Perspective, 5 No. 6 GLCY Law 2 (2000). For a
reply, see James C. McKay, Jr., UCITA and the Consumer: A Response to Professor
Braucher, 5 No. 8 GLCY Law 9 (2000). See also Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More
Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547 (1999).
15. More specifically, the Executive Director and the President.
16. According to my notes, the draft was pulled just before lunch on the first day of
reading. At that point, the sections on warranties were being read. Up to that time, each
of the objections to the draft, save one, had been rejected by the membership. We were
on a roll.
17. The official reason was that the agenda was crowded and that there were more
pressing matters to consider. The Executive Director of NCCUSL had the gall to restate
this "official reason" at the Workshop. The reason apparent to the Reporters and others
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Thereafter, the Drafting Committee was reconstituted and a new
Chair and Reporter were appointed.18 In the eighteen months since
that debacle, the July, 1999 draft has been re-conformed to the
current Article 2 with a few notable exceptions.19 Then the same ALI
which had approved the withdrawn draft in May, 1999 heard reports
on the new revision at the May, 2000 annual meeting and, unless the
entire project is shelved, will be asked (again) to approve the revised
draft at the May, 2001 annual meeting. The ALI reasoning appears to
be that the issue is whether the latest revision is better than the
current Article 2, not whether it is better or worse than the May, 1999
draft. Fair enough. But remember, the process must be repeated
with a new draft and with different players because of lobbying
pressure against the July, 1999 draft, not because of any considered
decision on the merits.
B. What's Going on Here?
Why did I resign in protest? Why not stick it out to the bitter
end? There are three basic reasons and all involve unilateral action
by NCCUSL's leadership. These actions fuel the growing critique of
the ALI-NCCUSL processes and disclose a public choice nightmare.
(1) Rise and Fall of Hub and Spoke and the Hostile Aftermath
The first disruption came early in the process. In March, 1995
NCCUSL tentatively approved a "hub and spoke" configuration for
Revised Article 2 and the proposed Article 2B, dealing then with
licenses of software. The "hub" was to consist of principles common
to both sales and licenses and the spokes were to consist of principles
that were unique to each transaction. With the approval of NCCUSL
leadership and the Article 2 Drafting Committee, a prototype "hub
and spoke" draft was prepared for reading at the 1995 annual meeting
was that a group of "strong sellers" strongly suggested that if the July, 1999 draft was
approved by NCCUSL, the group would oppose it in every State Legislature. Welcome to
NCCUSL spin city.
18. Both the new Chair and the Reporter had served with distinction on the earlier
Drafting Committee. Both are law professors who specialize in commercial law and
Commissioners.
19. For example, sections 2-313A and 2-313B of the October 5, 2000 draft, prepared
for the Council of the American Law Institute, retain in revised form provisions in the
July, 1999 draft which extended express warranties in carefully defined situations from
sellers to remote buyers. Other examples include a higher floor ($5,000) for the statute of
frauds, Rev. 2-201(a), and more exacting requirements to disclaim implied warranties in
consumer contracts, Rev. 2-316(b).
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of NCCUSL. At that time, both Ray Nimmer, the Reporter for
Article 2B, and I cautiously embraced this approach.'
After the annual meeting, NCCUSL leadership announced that
the "hub and spoke" prototype was dead and that a separate Drafting
Committee for Article 2B would be appointed." Although "hub and
spoke" created special challenges, it offered an opportunity to
achieve legitimate harmony between the two projects through a
centralized process. Its demise, however, killed any realistic chance
to maximize consistency and uniformity. Once the 2B (now UCITA)
drafting process became entrenched and achieved a life of its own, the
reluctance of UCITA to conform to Article 2 and vice versa became
palpable. Despite heroic efforts by Boris Auerbach, the Chair of the
Article 1 Drafting Committee, to harmonize the drafts, there were
now two processes with different agendas and politics proceeding at
their own pace. Harmonization could not be achieved.'
Another negative effect was that certain strong software
producers who opposed "hub and spoke" instinctively reinforced the
efforts of strong sellers to oppose proposed revisions in Article 2 that
appeared to favor buyers and consumers. Neither group wanted any
part of these changes. It is reported, for example, that the Software
Publishers Association (SPA) criticized the Article 2 draft as "being
skewed in favor of the consumers" and that a counsel to General
Electric attributed much of the pro-consumer bias of the Article 2
Drafting Committee to law professor members who had a pro-
consumer bias, "or are liberals."' General Electric, of course, was
one of the most consistent and persistent opponents to Revised
Article 2 throughout the process. The anti-Article 2 synergy was
apparent to all.
It now appears that the continuing disagreement over the
respective scope of Revised Article 2 and UCITA flows from this
process. UCITA supporters are unwilling to accept the risk that
Article 2 will apply to computer information embodied in disks or
embedded in other ("smart") goods. Assuming that the current
revision of Article 2 is better than the current Article 2 and should be
20. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337, 1384-1403 (1994) (cautiously
optimistic); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1313-15 (1994) (daunting questions still open to
debate).
21. Some of this history is recounted in McKay, supra note 14.
22. See Rusch, supra note 10, at 1714, who describes the harmonization meetings as
"excruciating" and explains how decentralized drafting processes going at their own pace
failed to harmonize provisions "that should be harmonized." I was there and I agree.
23. Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security,
10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 213,301, n.301 (1995).
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enacted, it is now beingheld hostage by UCITA. To put the matter
more directly, even though UCITA does not achieve broad
enactment, its proponents want a scope provision that keeps Article 2
out of the computer information game.'
(2) The Distinction Between Negotiated Terms and Standard Terms
The claim that Revised Article 2 was put together by a group of
liberal law professors who exalted consumer protection over the
interest of sellers must now be addressed. Consider the balance in
the current Article 2.
First, Article 2 drapes its framework of standards and rules over
all contexts where goods are sold. The starting point is the same
whether the contract involves natural gas, new cars, or- factory
equipment. The parties may, of course, vary the effect of the
framework by agreement. More importantly, the broad concept of
agreement links the particular bargain to trade usage and prior course
of dealing in the commercial context. Despite objections by the so-
called "new formalists," neither the July, 1999 nor the current draft of
Revised Article 2 retreat from this approach. To this extent, freedom
to vary the effect of Article 2 by agreement and Karl N. Llewellyn's
jurisprudence-the best extant example of realist thinking-remains
intact.25
Second, although Article 2 singles out merchant sellers and
buyers for special treatment, all other parties to contracts for sale are
subject to the same rules. Strong parties who are not merchants,
small businesses, and consumers are treated the same.
Third, no distinction is drawn between negotiated and non-
negotiated contracts or terms in the text of Article 2. Thus, standard
forms or terms are treated the same as negotiated or "dickered"
terms. This is true even though UCC section 2-207 purportedly deals
with the so-called "battle of the forms" in transactions where there
are both negotiated and non-negotiated terms.
Finally in bargains between merchant sellers and small business
or consumer buyers, there is a presumption of validity that arises
from the buyer's objective assent to the bargain unless
unconscionability can be established. But the defense of
unconscionability requires a costly judicial determination under a
-- vague, open-ended standard. Moreover, state and federal consumer
protection laws are limited in scope and vary widely from State to
24. The "game" has made it to the Wall Street Journal. See Thomas E. Weber,
Software Warranty Law Spurs Fears We'll Soon See Bugs Everywhere, WALL ST. J., Dec.
11, 2000, at B1.
25. See Imad D. Abyad, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl N. Llewellyn's Uniform
Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429 (1997).
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State. Thus, even if many consumers are well informed and have
market choices, the gaps in protection for consumers and small
businesses in transactions with strong buyers are large.
My conclusion from this (and the Drafting Committee
apparently agreed) is that the current Article 2 favors strong sellers.
They have power to disclaim warranties and limit remedies if the
buyer objectively assents. A well informed buyer with market choices
may or may not agree, but if the limitations are in standard forms and
are presented on a take-it-or-leave it basis, there- is a risk of
information asymmetry-i.e., unfair surprise-if the buyer assents
and there is a substantive imbalance favoring the seller in the terms
themselves. Concededly, the market over time provides some
balance in the content of standard terms, and other factors, such as
reputation, may induce strong sellers to adopt buyer friendly
practices. But not every seller responds or is responsible and, if there
are market failures, Article 2 as administered by courts is of little
help.
The Drafting Committee's initial strategy was to create
incentives for the greater disclosure of information by differentiating
between standard form and negotiated contracts and 2providing a
limited number of special rules for consumer contracts. Thus, the
November, 1996 draft defined "standard contracts" and "standard
terms" and used the new definitions in section 2-206, dealing with
standard form records in consumer contracts, and section 2-207,
entitled the "effect of varying terms." In both sections, the presence
of a standard form or term signaled the risk of unfair surprise which
was neutralized if the term was "expressly agreed" to. This put the
onus on a strong seller to disclose the term and obtain informed
consent.2
At the November, 1996 meeting of the Article 2 Drafting
Committee, the Drafting Committee and the Reporter were directed
by the Executive Director of NCCUSL to delete from the draft all
definitions and rules that turned on the defined terms. I protested
then and continued to protest this unilateral decision throughout the
process. Nevertheless, the drafting changes were made and in the
May and July, 1997 revisions there were no references to standard
forms or terms.
26. This strategy is best exemplified in the November, 1996 draft of Revised Article 2.
See also the July, 1996 Draft where the legislative history is detailed. The distinction
between standard form and negotiated terms is a persuasive ground to regulate against
unfair surprise. See Rubin, supra note 9.
27. To no one's surprise, Professor White objected to this approach, particularly one
proposed version of Revised section 2-206. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under
Revised Article 2,75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315 (1997).
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Despite this, many rules applicable to consumer contracts
survived this purge and are found in the latest draft of Revised
Article 2.' In addition, other revisions, notably the extension of
express warranties in sections 2-313A and 2-313B provide expanded
protection to all buyers. Nevertheless, the purge of the distinction
between negotiated and non-negotiated terms created its own
mischief.
First, Revised section 2-207 now becomes a giant "knockout"
rule, regardless of whether the terms knocked out were standard
terms. This masks the reasons for the original section 2-207, which
was designed to protect against unfair surprise and opportunistic
behavior when parties dealing at a distance exchanged standard forms
and terms. Unless reigned in by the courts, the result is overkill.
Second, Revised section 2-206 in the 1996 draft, which dealt with
standard form records in consumer contracts, was hung out to dry.
Even though successor drafts limited application to consumer
contracts, no one could agree on a standard for unfair surprise or
oppression without a statutory recognition that the cause of the
problem was standard terms drafted by sellers and offered on a take it
or leave it basis. The result was that Revised section 2-206 was
deleted in the July, 2000 draft and protection for consumers and small
businesses was left to section 2-302 and the comments.
Third, the decision complicated correcting the misinterpretation
of the UCC by the Gateway case 9 and finding a solution to the
treatment of material terms first disclosed to a buyer after payment
for and shipment of the goods. As a result, no solution to this
28. The October 5, 2000 draft of REVISED Article 2 retains some special rules for
consumers. See, e.g., Revised U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(11)(12) (October 5, 2000 draft Revised
Article 2 on file with Author) ("consumer" and "consumer contract" defined); id. at § 2-
104(a)(2) (Article 2 subject to any applicable law establishing a different rule for
consumers); id. at § 2-316(b) (disclaimer or implied warranties); 2-502(a)(1) (pre-paying
consumer buyer); id at § 2-508(b) (no cure in consumer contract after buyer revokes
acceptance); id at § 2-716(a) (agreed specific performance remedy not applicable in
consumer contract); id at § 2-718(a) (liquidated damages); id& at § 2-719(c) (effect of
exclusion of liability for personal injuries where consumer goods); id. at § 2-725(a)
(agreement reducing period of statute of limitations not effective in consumer contract).
The high-water mark for consumer protection was the November 1, 1996 draft,
prepared for the Council of the American Law Institute.
29. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) limited the application of
UCC § 2-207. to cases where both parties used standard forms and construed Article 2 to
create a rolling'contract in which the offer was proposed by the seller after payment and
shipment in the forms sent with the goods. The buyer accepted the terms, including an
arbitration clause, by using the goods without objection. This reading of Article 2 was
rejected in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. Kan. 2000), an action which
was later dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 2000 WL 1372886 (D. Kan. Sept.
6,2000). The so-called Gateway issues are discussed in James J. White, Autistic Contracts,
45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693 (2000).
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controversial problem appeared in either the July, 1999 or the current
draft of Revised Article 2. A proposed solution requiring a seller
who proposes standard terms to a buyer after the goods have been
paid for to either disclose those terms or warn that they are
forthcominge created a storm of controversy 
and was rejected." 
(3) The Fall of the July, 1999 Draft
In both Article 9 and UCITA, substantial economic interests
supported the legislation. Whether these interests captured the
project I cannot say, but, clearly, there was consistent interest by asset
based lenders in completing the Article 9 revisions and by software
producers in having comprehensive, separate legislation dealing with
transactions in computer information. Although consumer interests
were represented in both projects, for many commentators those
interests were not adequately reflected in the final drafts. In short,
both processes are open to the charge that not all interests were
adequately represented in the final product, especially the interests of
consumers and small business debtors and licensees of software.
In contrast, there was never a group of sellers or buyers or
consumers (or anyone) who strongly supported and pushed for the
revision of Article 2. Most agreed that Article 2 needed some
revision, but there was persistent disagreement about how much.
Except for the Drafting Committee and the Reporters, no one
devoted much effort to systematic advocacy for revision. This relative
indifference made it easy for the strong sellers that opposed the
revision either to block the project or recycle the revision until it died
an unnatural death.
The "strong sellers," such as General Electric, the American
Automobile Manufacturer's Association, and other manufacturers,
were well represented in the Article 2 drafting process. They
participated actively and helpfully in the discussions and prepared
careful memos after each meeting of the Drafting Committee. They
were also well represented in the ALI and lobbied extensively against
the revision before NCCUSL.' But despite many revisions in the
drafts to respond to their concerns and efforts by members of the
30. See REVISED U.C.C. § 2-207(e) (February 1, 1999 draft. Revised Article 2 on file
with Author).
31. This drafting history is described in White, supra note 29, at 1694 n.1. In
retrospect, Professor White suggests that the rejected solution would have been easy for a
seller to satisfy and doubts the wisdom of the opposition to it.
32. My friend and collaborator, James J. White, was a leader of the opposition to
Revised Article 2. As a sometimes consultant to the automobile industry, a member of
the American Law Institute, and, later in the game, a Commissioner from Michigan, he
opposed much of Revised Article 2 in print, on the floor of the ALI and NCCUSL, and in
strategy sessions with strong sellers outside of the process.
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Drafting Committee and NCCUSL leadership to negotiate with them,
they never proposed (to my knowledge at least) any revisions which,
if agreed to by the Drafting Committee, would close the deal. The
attitude was do it our way or else, but there was no indication of what
their way was. Those who negotiated for NCCUSL were bargaining
against themselves.3 Despite losing on the merits before the Drafting
Committee and the ALI (and, in all probability, before NCCUSL
membership), the strong sellers opposed the revision and, it appears,
threatened to oppose it when proposed for enactment by the States.
At this point, NCCUSL leadership knuckled under and pulled the
draft that they and the ALI concluded had "gotten it right."
A cynic might characterize these strong sellers as poor losers who
bargained in bad faith and never came to grips with the merits of the
proposed revision. Their vocal opposition in public (as opposed to
their participation before the Drafting Committee) was infused by
high rhetoric, and many assertions were, quite frankly, false. But let's
be practical. The public rhetoric concealed the reality that, as strong
sellers, they were very pleased with the current Article 2. Limited
only by the porous doctrines of unconscionability and good faith,
strong sellers are able to shape the contract to fit their interests,
particularly where small business and consumers are involved. Given
this preference for the status quo (and with no interest group
lobbying for revision), the strong sellers were content to dig in their
heels and resist any change of substance, especially if it improved the
position of weaker buyers."
Conclusion
In my opinion, the latest draft of Revised Article 2 is better than
the current Article 2 and, if agreement can be reached with UCITA's
leadership on the scope provision, should be approved by the
membership of NCCUSL and the ALL.
33. As the Reporter, I did not participate in these negotiating sessions. My role was to
shape the agenda (at least in the early going), express my opinion of what the law was and
should be, and to draft text and comments that responded to decisions by the Drafting
Committee. Yes, I had a point of view on many issues and, perhaps, expressed it more
often than many would have liked. But in the final analysis, I was a Reporter not a
negotiator. The role of Reporter as negotiator may be influenced by the Chair of the
Drafting Committee. With a strong Chair, the Reporter may have a greater role in
negotiating. Article 2 had a knowledgeable but relatively passive Chair.
34. A persistent strategy was to resist any changes in the statute to which they did not
agree, and to urge that the matter be addressed in the comments or left to the courts. The
comments, however, were to be negotiated with and approved by them. Moreover,
leaving it to the courts worked to the disadvantage of consumers and small businesses who
concluded that the cost of litigation was not worth the result.
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Nevertheless, from my limited view in the trenches, it appears
that the conduct of NCCUSL leadership (not the Executive
Committee or the membership), responding to pressure from strong
sellers, software producers and other lobbyist, seriously compromised
the Article 2 drafting process in three ways.
First, the leadership rejected the hub and spoke draft because
software producers and others wanted their own drafting process and
statute. The software producers opposed Article 2's stance on buyer
protection. Throughout the process, NCCUSL imposed pressure on
both projects to conform substance in circumstances where that was
not possible. Once hub and spoke was dead, the hope for substantial
conformity went with it. More importantly, the software producers
aligned with strong sellers to oppose the allegedly pro-buyer stance of
Revised Article 2.
Second, having released UCITA from the confines of "hub and
spoke," the leadership then purged the standard form and standard
term provisions from the November, 1996 draft of Revised Article 2,
apparently again responding to pressure from the strong sellers.
Once purged, the ability to deal with issues where the distinction was
essential was impaired. Ironically, UCITA retained the distinction,
although its substantive provisions today depend less on it than did
earlier drafts."
Third, having purged the standard form rules, the leadership,
without a vote from the Executive Committee, then withdrew the
July, 1999 draft from the agenda because of continued opposition
from the strong sellers and their threats to oppose enactment. This
deprived the membership of the opportunity to vote on the merits. If
the membership vote was "no," then a total redraft of the July, 1999
draft would have been justified. But if the membership voted "yes," a
probable result, then NCCUSL leadership would have been in a
stronger position to test the strength of the supposed opposition and
to bargain for justified changes. Moreover the approved final draft
could be studied and critiqued by scholars and others without having
to dig into the electronic bins of legislative history.
Finally, how persuasive is it for the ALI to reconsider the July,
1999 draft (which got it right) on the ground that the issue is whether
the latest revision is better than the current Article 2 not whether it is
worse that the July, 1999 Draft? Is this a-cop out that fails to consider
the opportunity costs of not standing by its guns in the face of interest
group lobbying? These are challenging questions for a respected
institution whose members are expected to "check their clients at the
door." Why reconsider the latest draft of Revised Article 2 when that
35. See UCITA § 102(a)(60) (2001) ("standard form" defined).
March 2001] A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES
620 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
compromised draft is the result of lobbying pressure from lawyers
who represented their strong seller clients all too well?
In my judgment, none of the challenges made or questions asked
in this paper were adequately addressed in the comments of the ALI
and NCCUSL speakers on this panel. A grudging conclusion is that
the partnership has succumbed to the notion that what's good for
General Electric and other strong sellers is good for the American
law of sales.
